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Single Idea 15962

[filed under theme 12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities ]

Full Idea

Perhaps Boyle's most important technical terms is 'texture'. ...It must not be confused with the way we feel the texture of a surface like sandpaper or velvet; it is rather a structure of unobservable particles and so it is not directly observable.

Gist of Idea

Boyle's term 'texture' is not something you feel, but is unobservable structures of particles

Source

report of Robert Boyle (The Origin of Forms and Qualities [1666]) by Peter Alexander - Ideas, Qualities and Corpuscles 03.2

Book Ref

Alexander,Peter: 'Ideas, Qualities and Corpuscles' [CUP 1985], p.66


A Reaction

This is the basis for Alexander's reassessment of what Boyle and Locke meant by a 'secondary quality', which, he says, is a physical feature of objects, not a mental experience.


The 32 ideas with the same theme [qualities seeming to involve the observer]:

Some objects of sensation are unique to one sense, where deception is impossible [Aristotle]
Some knowledge is lost if you lose a sense, and there is no way the knowledge can be replaced [Aristotle]
Epicurus says colours are relative to the eye, not intrinsic to bodies [Epicurus, by Plutarch]
Non-graspable presentations are from what doesn't exist, or are not clear and distinct [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius]
Changes in secondary qualities are caused by changes in primary qualities [Giles of Orleans]
Heat and colour don't exist, so cannot mislead about the external world [Galileo, by Tuck]
Tastes, odours and colours only reside in consciousness, and would disappear with creatures [Galileo]
Our sensation of light may not be the same as what produces the sensation [Descartes]
Boyle's term 'texture' is not something you feel, but is unobservable structures of particles [Boyle, by Alexander,P]
Boyle's secondary qualities are not illusory, or 'in the mind' [Boyle, by Alexander,P]
In my view Locke's 'textures' are groups of corpuscles which are powers (rather than 'having' powers) [Locke, by Alexander,P]
I suspect that Locke did not actually believe colours are 'in the mind' [Locke, by Heil]
Secondary qualities are simply the bare powers of an object [Locke]
We know objects by perceptions, but their qualities don't reveal what it is we are perceiving [Leibniz]
Secondary qualities conjure up, and are confused with, the sensations which produce them [Reid]
Colours and tastes are not qualities of things, but alterations of the subject [Kant]
I can make no sense of the red experience being similar to the quality in the object [Kant]
Armstrong suggests secondary qualities are blurred primary qualities [Armstrong, by Robinson,H]
Secondary qualities are microscopic primary qualities of physical things [Armstrong]
Lockean secondary qualities (unlike primaries) produce particular sensory experiences [McGinn]
Could there be a mind which lacked secondary quality perception? [McGinn]
Secondary qualities contain information; their variety would be superfluous otherwise [McGinn]
The utility theory says secondary qualities give information useful to human beings [McGinn]
If objects are not coloured, and neither are sense-contents, we are left saying that nothing is coloured [Robinson,H]
Shape can be experienced in different ways, but colour and sound only one way [Robinson,H]
If secondary qualities match senses, would new senses create new qualities? [Robinson,H]
Phenol-thio-urea tastes bitter to three-quarters of people, but to the rest it is tasteless, so which is it? [Crane]
Secondary qualities are just primary qualities considered in the light of their effect on us [Heil]
Colours aren't surface properties, because of radiant sources and the colour of the sky [Heil]
Although colour depends on us, we can describe the world that way if it picks out fundamentals [Fine,K]
The colour bands of the spectrum arise from our biology; they do not exist in the physics [Sorensen]
The taste of chocolate is a 'finer-grained' sensation than the taste of sweetness [Polger]